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585 
The Justification of Human Rights 
David Little1 
This article is divided into two sections. The first part 
summarizes arguments regarding the justification of human rights 
and the relation of human rights to religion developed more 
extensively elsewhere.2 The second part provides the intellectual 
background of the arguments, and is intended to elaborate and 
elucidate key ideas contained in the summary. 
I 
The position defended here follows from an effort to recover and 
rehabilitate the natural rights tradition. The idea of natural rights is 
taken not to depend on religious belief, though religious belief is 
certainly to be protected and accommodated. Rather, the idea of 
natural rights rests on an understanding of human nature as 
“rational, self-aware, and morally responsible.”3 
This understanding supports a primary notion of subjective 
rights, which means that all individuals, simply as individuals, possess 
an entitlement to demand (or have demanded for them) a certain 
performance or forbearance under threat of sanction for 
noncompliance. The understanding also entails certain correlative 
 
 1. A version of this summary, entitled “The Justification of Human Rights,” was 
delivered at the Twentieth Annual Symposium on International Law and Religion, J. Reuben 
Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, October 7, 2013. 
 2. DAVID LITTLE, ESSAYS ON RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: GROUND TO STAND 
ON (2015). 
 3. BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS, 
NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAW, 1150-1625 (1997). “A ‘right’ is an entitlement, a due 
liberty and power to do or not to do certain things; ‘natural’ means what is neither of human 
devising (by law or by agreement) nor conferred by a special command of God [or other 
supernatural warrant]. Natural rights are thus entitlements belonging to human nature as such, 
in virtue of the superanimal sensibilities and capacities, and therefore to every human being.” 
T.E. Jessop, Natural Rights, in DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 225 (1967). As they 
developed in the Western Christian tradition, natural rights have been considered “minimal” 
or “vestigial” in that they are “left over” after “the fall,” or the willful defection of human 
beings from the divinely-appointed standards of human fulfillment. As such, they provide 
imperatives of moral restraint and guidance that are necessary but by no means sufficient for 
human fulfillment. 
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duties and obligations owed by every individual in respect to 
protecting the rights of others. 
Though moral and legal rights may converge, they are 
distinguishable in regard to the character of the applicable sanction: 
legal rights are physically enforceable within a system of laws whose 
officials possess effective authority over a monopoly of legitimate 
force; moral rights are otherwise enforceable, for example, by verbal 
censure. 
The range of subjective rights under consideration is focused 
especially on the protection of certain requirements for survival taken 
to be common to every human being. Among other things, natural 
rights protect against arbitrary force, which, minimally, is the 
infliction of death, physical impairment, severe pain/suffering for 
entirely self-serving and/or knowingly mistaken reasons. To refer 
only to self-interest or knowingly to deceive in the act of inflicting 
death, severe pain, etc., is “morally incomprehensible” because the 
reasons given are no reasons at all.4 This is not an observation about 
what human beings happen to believe or not. It is an observation 
about what, as rational and moral agents, human beings are able to 
believe or not, are able to make sense of or not. It is about the 
meaning of moral reason as regards the justification of action 
pertaining to critical aspects of human survival. Thus, the random 
slaughter of some twenty-six school children and teachers in 
Newtown, Connecticut in December 2012 is necessarily regarded as 
an act of “senseless violence.” 
On this understanding, force (as sanction) may be used in 
response to arbitrary force so long as it is demonstrably aimed at 
combating and restraining arbitrary force, and does that consistent 
with three “rules of reason”: necessity, proportionality, and 
effectiveness. 
 
 4. A case of “necessity,” in which an innocent party is killed in order for someone else 
to survive, is not an exception to this statement since the reasons excusing the act must also 
include strong proof that there was no alternative course of action. Such a defense is based not 
only on a reference to the self-interest of the one doing the killing. It therefore does not utterly 
disregard the interests of the victim, as in a “pure” case of arbitrary force. Still, cases of 
necessity are inescapably perplexing from a moral point of view precisely because of the gravity 
of the prohibition against hurting others to one’s advantage. As an exhibit of the unavoidable 
perplexity, see, for example, Hugo Grotius’s somewhat tortuous discussion of the issue. HUGO 
GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, INCLUDING THE LAW OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS 
92, 92–94 (1979). 
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Accordingly, it is held that human rights language, consisting of 
rights regarded as both moral and legal, rests on such an 
understanding. Six points may help clarify this understanding of 
human rights language. 
1. Such language was drafted and codified in direct response 
to a paradigmatic case of arbitrary force, namely, the 
record, particularly, of German fascist practices before 
and during World War II. 
2. It enshrines a basic set of rights, referred to in Article 4 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
as “nonderogable” (nonabridgeable) rights, which 
protect everyone against the worst forms of arbitrary 
force: extra-judicial killing, torture, “cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment,” enslavement, 
denials of certain forms of due process, and violations of 
freedom of conscience, religion or belief. Protection 
against discrimination “solely on the ground of race, 
colour, sex, language, religion or social origin” is also 
included.5 We should add to this list what are called 
“atrocity crimes,” as codified in the Statute of Rome, the 
Charter of the International Criminal Court. Genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression, as 
defined in the Charter,6 are all egregious examples of 
arbitrary force. Beyond these provisions, there is no list of 
nonderogable rights in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), but 
there are some interesting developments in that 
direction. In General Comment 14, the Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has enumerated a 
set of “core obligations” requisite for guaranteeing 
Article 12 of the ICESCR, which guarantees “the right 
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
 
 5. Articles. 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18, explicitly identified as non-
derogable, appear in Article 4, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR. Int’l Covenant on Civil & Political 
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171–78. The prohibition against discrimination is 
mentioned in Article 4, paragraph 1 may also be assumed to be non-derogable. 
 6. Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8. Rome Statute of the Int’l Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 3–9. The crime of aggression is not defined in the Charter, but left to further 
negotiation and agreement. Still, endeavoring to prohibit aggression is, at the least, an effort to 
outlaw “wars of conquest” which regularly exemplified self-serving uses of force. 
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standard of physical and mental health,” and it has ruled 
that “a State party cannot, under any circumstances 
whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with the core 
obligations . . . which are non-derogable.”7 Failure to 
enforce these obligations, where feasible, would 
constitute arbitrary neglect, a close relative of arbitrary 
force. 
3. It adds a set of “derogable” rights (abridgeable under 
only the most extreme circumstances, such as 
emergencies), like freedom of speech, assembly, and 
participation in government, that are designed to assure 
maximum protection against the violation of 
nonderogable rights. 
4. Though human rights language explicitly obligates 
individuals, it also obligates states,8 meaning that states 
exercise force legitimately insofar as they enforce human 
rights; otherwise, they administer force illegitimately, 
which is to say, arbitrarily. 
5. With the development of the modern state, the 
technology of repression has outstripped the organs of 
restraint, making all the more urgent the protection of 
human rights. 
6. Violations of nonderogable rights and prohibitions 
against atrocity crimes are “wrong in themselves”—
 
 7. The core obligations, which every State party is bound to comply with, are such 
things as, “ensuring the right to access to health facilities, goods and services on a non-
discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups”; “ensuring access to 
minimum essential food which is nutritionally adequate and safe, and to ensure freedom from 
hunger for everyone”; “ensuring access to basic shelter, housing, and sanitation, and an 
adequate supply of safe and potable water”; and “ensuring equitable distribution of all health 
facilities, goods and services.” Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, General Comment 
14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), U.N. DOC. 
E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. DOC. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev/6 at 85 (2003), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4538838d0.html. 
 8. Preambles of the ICCPR and the ICESCR: “Realizing that the individual, having 
duties to other individuals and to the community to which [the individual] belongs, is under 
responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant,” and “Considering the obligations of States under the Charter of the 
United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
freedoms[.]” Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5, at pmbl.; Int’l 
Covenant on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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”outrages,” that is, against the “conscience of 
humankind,” in the updated language of the Preamble to 
the UDHR, and they are also a severe threat to “peace in 
the world,” as the Preamble also states. 
Thus, the moral foundation of human rights language consists of 
“natural” rather than “extranatural” or “supernatural” assumptions 
concerning the absolute inviolability of prohibitions against arbitrary 
force. The idea of natural rights also pertains to the protection of 
public goods—health, safety, order, and morals9— that are assumed 
to be of common natural concern as vital requirements for human 
survival. The natural grounding in both cases is “secular” in the 
sense that it is accessible to and obligatory upon all human beings, 
regardless of distinctions “such as religion,” in the words of Article 2 
of the UDHR. 
Where, then, does religion come in? A key feature of arbitrary 
force as practiced by the German fascists was the relentless 
imposition by force of a specific set of beliefs upon everyone under 
their control. That meant the systematic persecution of all religious 
and other forms of dissent. Such actions were a serious violation, 
according to a natural rights understanding, because coercion is not 
a justification for believing the truth or rightness of anything. When 
someone says, “Believe what I tell you or I’ll punish you,” that is a 
clear case of arbitrary force—of using force without justification. 
Expressions of belief can of course be curtailed by coercion, but that 
just begs the question whether such coercion is justified. 
In human rights language, therefore, such reasoning protects 
“conscience, religion, or belief” against “being subject to coercion 
which would impair . . . freedom to adopt a religion or belief of 
[one’s] choice.”10 
When held up alongside the “natural” justification of human 
rights language, the special protection of “conscience, religion, or 
belief” (and the practices associated with them), assured by Art. 18 
of the UDHR and ICCPR, introduces what I call, a “two-tiered” 
system of justification. 
 
 9. See Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5, at 178 (referring 
specifically to Article 18, paragraph 3). It is not clear that the term “public morals” has any 
determined meaning in human rights jurisprudence. 
 10. Id. at 178 (Article 18, para. 2). 
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The first tier lays down a “natural” (secular) justification that 
serves to hold people everywhere accountable to the terms of the 
language, backed by a provision for universally legitimate 
enforceability (subject to the three “rules of reason”), as well as to 
provide standards of protection to which everyone may appeal, 
regardless of religious or other identity. 
The second tier permits and secures a wide, highly pluralistic 
range of “extranatural” justifications for human rights language, and, 
of course, for much else related to the broad expanse of human 
social life and experience. Second-tier matters are irreducibly 
pluralistic because, among other things, they involve intimate, 
subjective experience in regard to social attachment, loyalty, and 
identity, as well as ultimate sacred commitments not readily given 
up. Learning to tolerate and respect without violence these 
inescapable differences, by upholding the right to freedom of 
conscience, religion, or belief, appears to be both “right in itself” 
and critical to achieving peace, as is conclusively shown in the recent 
book by Grim and Finke on the connection between violence and 
violations of religious freedom.11 
Religious and other forms of second-tier justification are 
undoubtedly indispensable for mobilizing adherents to the cause of 
human rights. It is also clear that whether it supports or challenges 
human rights language, sustained attention to that language by 
different communities of conscience, religious or not, can help 
identify lacunae or blind spots in the human rights instruments. Such 
attention also can assist in finding, where necessary, colloquially 
acceptable substitutes for human rights language, and can even bring 
about significant change, for example, in interpreting and applying 
religious freedom, as has happened as the result of litigation by 
minority religions in the United States and elsewhere. 
Engagement with human rights matters in these ways illustrates 
the importance of the second tier in the ongoing, often complicated, 
and sometimes testy negotiations between the two tiers. One 
additional function of particular significance, performed by the 
second tier, is the process of appealing for conscientious exemptions 
from general and neutral laws permitted by human rights 
 
 11. BRIAN J. GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIGIOUS 
PERSECUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011). 
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jurisprudence.12 Of special note is the requirement that in imposing 
restrictions on conscientious belief and practice, the state bears the 
burden of proof in demonstrating both that there is a compelling 
state interest at stake, and that the restriction is as unintrusive as 
possible. In that way tier two serves to limit the reach of tier one, 
and to remind it of its obligation of special deference to tier two. 
At the same time, all these second tier undertakings are 
themselves constrained by the first tier, in accord with the underlying 
assumptions of human rights language. Tier-two justifications must 
yield to the inviolability of the “natural” prohibitions against 
arbitrary force and arbitrary neglect, as well as of the state’s 
responsibility, “as prescribed by law” and as is “necessary,” for 
protecting the public goods of safety, health, order, and morals, and 
the “fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”13 
The proposal, in sum, is that human rights language rests on a 
natural rights understanding that prescribes a two-tiered theory of 
justification. Accordingly, the first tier protects, encourages, and is 
limited by the second tier, but it also constrains the second tier in 
very important ways. 
II 
I started attending seriously to the subject of human rights in the 
1980s, sparked initially by the election of President Ronald Reagan 
at the beginning of the decade. Reagan’s predecessor, Jimmy Carter, 
together with an active cohort of members of Congress, had given 
human rights a central place in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. 
When Reagan came to office, he made clear his strong opposition to 
Carter’s emphasis, and his determination to reconfigure radically the 
role of human rights in foreign affairs. At first, it appeared he would 
ignore human rights altogether. But gradually he turned to enlisting 
human rights in the fight against Communism, with especially 
controversial effects in Central America, where Reagan’s policies 
were perceived by critics as being much more attentive to the abuses 
of the Communists than of their anti-Communist opponents. 
 
 12. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, 
Conscience and Religion (Art. 18), July 30, 1993, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fb22.html. 
 13. See Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5, at 178 (Article 18, 
para. 3). 
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The intense and continuing debates between Carter and Reagan 
supporters at the time piqued my interest in human rights on the 
level of law and policy, as well as of theory. It was not, it seemed, 
simply a question of how the state and others might interpret and 
apply human rights, but also of how, if at all, they could be justified. 
That is where the idea of natural rights came in. Whatever other 
influences there are, human rights language is undeniably rooted in 
the natural rights tradition, associated, as it is, with Western 
philosophical and theological thought. The problem was that, at the 
time, controversies over the status of natural rights theory were as 
acute and seemingly intractable as the controversies over law and 
policy. The idea of natural rights is not the only conceivable basis for 
supporting human rights, but to refute it successfully removes 
human rights’ most venerable foundation. 
The idea of natural rights—that human beings “are entitled to 
make certain claims by virtue simply of their common humanity”14—
has long been under assault, going back to the well-known attacks in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by David Hume, Jeremy 
Bentham, and Karl Marx. Related attacks continued into the 
twentieth century, gaining momentum around the time of the 
adoption of the UDHR by the UN General Assembly in December 
1948. Anticipating that event, the American Anthropological 
Association, for example, submitted a widely noted statement on 
human rights to the UN Human Rights Commission in 1947, 
denouncing the very idea of universally binding moral claims. 
Margaret Macdonald’s influential essay on natural rights, written that 
same year, supported this conclusion.15 Subsequently, similarly 
skeptical statements appeared up into the eighties, advanced by 
figures like Alasdair MacIntyre16 and Richard Rorty.17 
In the midst of all the controversy, I, however, remained 
unconvinced by the opposition. In 1986, I published an essay on 
natural rights and human rights,18 reexamining the ideas of John 
Locke (1632-1704) in some detail, and arguing that Locke’s natural 
 
 14. Margaret Macdonald, Natural Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS 40, 40 (1970). 
 15. Id. 
 16. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981). 
 17. RICHARD RORTY, THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982). 
 18. David Little, Natural Rights and Human Rights: The International Imperative, in 
NATURAL RIGHTS AND NATURAL LAW: THE LEGACY OF GEORGE MASON 67 (Robert 
Davidoff ed.,1986). 
DO NOT DELETE 7/10/2015  12:08 PM 
585 The Justification of Human Rights 
 593 
rights theory did not fit the fashionable Marxist model, according to 
which rights talk expresses nothing more than bourgeois interests 
that are essentially egoistic in character. On the contrary, the whole 
point of natural rights for Locke was to protect everyone everywhere 
against self-serving rule, something that permitted anyone in 
command to “do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the 
least liberty to anyone to question or control those who execute his 
pleasure[,] . . . and . . . whatsoever he does, whether led by reason, 
mistake, or passion, must be submitted to.” Such an arrangement 
also allowed individuals to stand as judges in their own case, where 
“he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will scarce be 
so just as to condemn himself for it.”19 Nor did Locke exempt 
economic life from these strictures: Everyone everywhere possesses 
“a right to the surplusage of [another’s] goods. . .as will [prevent] 
extreme want, where [there is] no means to subsist otherwise.” 
Moreover, no one may “justly make use of another’s necessity, to 
force him to become his vassal, by withholding that relief God 
requires him to afford to the wants of his brother, than he that has 
more strength can seize upon a weaker [person], master him . . . , 
and with a dagger at his throat offer him death or slavery.”20 
Having endeavored to set the record straight, I proceeded in my 
article to mount a constructive case in favor of a natural rights 
approach. The line of argument was stimulated by a passing 
comment of Locke’s and by some perceptive insights of Gregory 
Vlastos21 and Thomas Nagel22 about the nature of the conditions 
under which pain may or may not be inflicted or relieved. 
Commenting on the education of youth, Locke bemoaned the high 
esteem bestowed on military conquerors “who for the most part are 
but the great butchers of mankind.” Their typical exploits, he says, 
tend to encourage an “unnatural cruelty,” “especially the pleasure 
[taken] to put anything in pain that is capable of it.”23 The 
implication, supported by the suggestions of Vlastos and Nagel, is 
 
 19. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 2d Treatise, ch.II, § 13, at 316–
17 (1965). 
 20. Id. at 1st Treatise, ch.4, § 42, at 205–06. 
 21. Gregory Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 51 (Richard B. Brandt 
ed., 1962). 
 22. Thomas Nagel, Limits of Objectivity, in TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 
108 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1980). 
 23. JAMES L. AXTELL, THE EDUCATIONAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 226–27 (1968). 
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that giving self-serving reasons for inflicting pain or for taking 
advantage of someone in pain by withholding relief is the essence of 
cruelty, something morally unthinkable or indisputably “wrong in 
itself.” 
In this way the idea of a natural right can, I contended, be 
justified. The argument provides warrant for the notion of a 
subjective entitlement possessed by all individuals, simply as 
individuals, to demand (or have demanded for them) that no one of 
them shall be subjected to arbitrary force or arbitrary neglect under 
threat of sanction for noncompliance. Given that a claim of this sort 
is meant to be respected universally, certain correlative duties and 
obligations so to respect the right are, by implication, owed by every 
individual to every other individual. 
The right is “natural” because any mature, competent human 
being, “without [that is] distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property birth or other status,”24 is expected to recognize the 
blatant incongruity, and, hence, patent unjustifiability, of inflicting 
pain or taking advantage of those in pain for self-serving motives, 
and, consequently, is obligated to refrain from acting in that way. 
Anyone reliably suspected of so acting is therefore liable to 
sanction—subject, of course, to the three “rules of reason”: 
necessity, proportionality, and effectiveness. That is true whether, as 
Locke implies, the motives are disguised by reason, or are the result 
of a knowing or negligent mistake or simply of passion. Indeed, 
Locke’s whole theory of government, including the design for 
administering legal sanctions, is grounded in this understanding. “I 
easily grant,” he says, that civil government is the proper remedy for 
the inconveniences of the state of nature” where “self-love will make 
men partial to themselves and to their friends,. . .and that ill-nature, 
passion, and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others[.]”25 
In short, the ultimate objective of government is that everyone “may 
be restrained from invading others’ rights and from doing hurt to 
one another, and [that] the law of nature be observed, which wills 
the peace and preservation of all mankind.”26 
 
 24. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, art. 2 (1948). 
 25. LOCKE, supra note 17, at 316, 2d Treatise, ch. II, § 13. 
 26. Id. at 312, ch. II, § 7. 
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Around the time the article supporting natural rights appeared, I 
published a related essay on the Puritan dissident and founder of the 
Rhode Island colony, Roger Williams (1603-1683), in which I 
analyzed and promoted his defense of freedom of conscience and 
separation of church and state.27 I believed the effort was important 
not only because Williams’s arguments were intrinsically appealing, 
as well as anticipating some of Locke’s ideas, but also because 
Williams had, for the most part, been so badly misunderstood by 
those who should know better. In particular, there was (and 
continues to be) the widespread failure to understand the Calvinist 
roots of Williams’s thinking, a point I introduced in the essay, but 
went on to develop more extensively in subsequent writings.28 The 
key idea is the distinction between the two tables of the Decalogue, 
or the Ten Commandments. The article focused on the deep and 
abiding tension in Reformed Christianity, beginning with Calvin 
himself. Early in his career, Calvin taught that it was not the state’s 
job to enforce the first table—matters of religious belief or 
conscience, but only the second table—moral and civic matters, 
whose principle is that “all individuals should preserve their rights” 
in regard to life, liberty, and property, or what Calvin often called 
natural rights. This teaching assumed a distinction between the 
“inward forum” or conscience that should not be coerced, and the 
“outward forum” or affairs of state that should. Later in his career, 
Calvin sharply altered his position, authorizing the state to regulate 
the first as well as the second table. 
Williams’s position on freedom of conscience and church-state 
relations was, in large part, simply an elaboration of the early Calvin, 
whereas his opponents, the authorities of the Massachusetts Bay 
colony who expelled him, sided with the later Calvin. In defending 
himself, Williams provided extensive commentary on the two tables 
of the Decalogue, on the distinction between the jurisdictions of the 
“inward” and “outward” forums, and, like Calvin and other 
members of the Reformed tradition, on the importance of 
constitutional government, including protection of “natural and civil 
rights and liberties” that make up the “natural freedom of the 
 
 27. David Little, Roger Williams and the Separation of Church and State, in RELIGION 
AND STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER 3 (James E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1985). 
 28. David Little, Roger Williams and the Puritan Background of the Establishment 
Clause, in T. JEREMY GUNN & JOHN WITTE, JR., NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION: 
AMERICA’S ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 100 (2012). 
DO NOT DELETE 7/10/2015  12:08 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
596 
people.” Noteworthy was his ability to advance his views in the 
Rhode Island colony by successfully excluding any reference to 
religious privileges in the Charter of 1644 and the Civil Code 1647, 
and by explicitly codifying an expansive right to freedom of 
conscience in the Charter of 1663. His mode of discourse, 
intermixing extensive biblical exposition with “free-standing” appeals 
to reason, nature, and experience is very much in the Calvinist 
tradition, starting with Calvin himself.29 
While for Williams the idea of temporal government is divinely 
ordained, he leaves no doubt that the “power, might or authority” 
of particular governments “is not religious, Christian, etc., but 
natural, humane, and civil.”30 Clearly implied is a notion of “secular” 
or “public reason,” according to which any well-ordered government 
should be conducted. The notion rests on “natural” rather than 
“extranatural” or “supernatural” assumptions concerning the 
protection of public goods, like health, safety, and order, taken to be 
of universal concern as vital requirements of human survival. 
It also rests on the idea that any attempt by an earthly 
government to regulate coercively matters of conscience or belief, 
beside those that incite to a violation of public safety or order, 
constitutes an act of arbitrary or unjustified force—of “soul rape,” as 
Williams repeatedly calls it. “The binding and rebinding of 
conscience [by force], contrary [to] or without its own persuasion, 
so weakens and defiles it that it . . . loseth its strength and the very 
nature of a common honest conscience.”31 The essence of conscience 
is inward consent based on a conviction of truth and right. Physical 
force, in and of itself, cannot produce that. Belief depends on reasons 
consisting of argument and evidence, and the threat of force, as in a 
case of robbery or rape, is not a reason in the proper sense because it 
lacks justification. Thus, the only “weapons” suitably employed in 
the inward forum are “spiritual,” namely appeals and arguments 
subject to rational standards, whose object is consensual or heartfelt 
agreement. Accordingly, “forcing the conscience of any person” is 
action that deforms conscience by inducing hypocrisy, narrow-
mindedness, or self-betrayal. 
 
 29. See David Little, Calvin and Natural Rights, 10 POL. THEOLOGY 411 (2009). 
 30. 3 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 398 (1963). 
 31. 4 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 209 (1963). 
DO NOT DELETE 7/10/2015  12:08 PM 
585 The Justification of Human Rights 
 597 
Consequently, Williams favored a broadly pluralistic society 
including all manner of Protestants, Catholics,32 Jews, 
“Mohammedans,” and “pagans” or Native Americans, and even 
those “who turn atheistical and irreligious.” By no means did he 
support protection only for those groups manifesting a 
“hyperindividualistic,” strongly “protestant” religious outlook, as has 
been alleged. On the contrary, Williams advocated accommodating 
as diverse a range as possible in matters of religion and conscience, 
urging only that the rights and duties, the benefits and burdens, of 
citizenship be kept scrupulously separate from such considerations. 
As with Locke, the overriding objective of such an arrangement is 
“keeping the peace.” “Among those that profess the same God and 
Christ as Papists and Protestants, or the same Muhammed as the 
Turks and Persians, . . . civil peace would [not] be broken 
(notwithstanding their differences in religion) were it not for the 
bloody doctrine of persecution, which alone breaks the bonds of civil 
peace, and makes spiritual causes the causes of their bloody 
dissensions . . . .”33 
It is true that throughout his lifetime, and well into the 
eighteenth century, Williams’s ideas had little impact outside Rhode 
Island. However, as I argued in the article, that all changed around 
the time of the American Revolution and the founding of the 
Republic by way of Williams’s influence on Locke and Isaac Backus 
(1724-1806), the intrepid lobbyist for religious liberty at the time of 
the Constitutional convention. Williams’s impact on Backus is 
indisputable, since Backus wrote what amounted to an early 
biography of Williams, and regularly cited him, even though he was 
not as radical as Williams. Backus sought to remove established 
religion such as existed in many of the colonies at the time, but he 
still advocated support for a form of civil religion requiring a 
religious test for public office. Williams’s influence on Locke is a 
more uncertain matter, though there is significant scholarly support 
 
 32. Williams does flirt at one point with the acceptability of requiring the display of 
special insignia on members of religious groups like the Catholics in protecting national 
security, though he does that in the context of a discussion of reasons for trusting and 
respecting Catholics, and, in fact, for considering some extremist Protestant sectarians as a 
greater threat to national security than Catholics. Id. at 313–15. 
 33. Roger Williams, Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody, in ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: 
SELECTIONS FROM THE WORKS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 183 (James Calvin Davis ed., 2008). 
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for it,34 and the similarities of argument in regard to natural rights, 
freedom of conscience, and the separation of church and state are 
striking. Nevertheless, whatever Williams’s impact on Locke, Locke, 
like Backus, was not as liberal as Williams, arguing that atheists, 
Catholics, and Muslims should not be accorded freedom of 
conscience. 
Since I wrote those two essays in the 1980s, the literature on 
natural rights, including the connection to freedom of conscience, 
has grown substantially, often in appreciation of certain lines of 
argument in the tradition. Brian Tierney’s book, The Idea of Natural 
Rights,35 published in 1997, revolutionized study of the topic by 
refuting the popular belief that natural rights represent a “deformed 
version of Christian ideas.” Tierney also rejected the assertions that 
natural rights glorify egoistic individualism (as Marx claimed), and 
emphasize an anti-religious bias derived from the Enlightenment (as 
many still claim). Rather, the natural rights are to be understood as 
the product of a “great age of creative jurisprudence” in twelfth- and 
thirteenth-century medieval Europe at the hands of inventive canon 
lawyers and monastic theologians whose moral and legal theories 
“may still prove of value in our political discourse.”36 Of special 
importance in anticipating Locke’s arguments against arbitrary force 
is Tierney’s description of the right of self-defense—considered in 
the tradition as “the greatest of rights”—namely, “a natural 
inalienable right [inhering] in individuals and communities . . . that 
could be exercised by subjects against a tyrannical ruler.”37 
Judith Shklar’s influential essay, “The Liberalism of Fear,” 
appearing in 1989,38 strongly reinforced the approach I was 
developing. She claimed that the critical feature of a liberal theory of 
government is the prevention of “arbitrary, unexpected, unnecessary, 
and unlicensed acts of force [including] habitual and pervasive acts of 
 
 34. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S 
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY, 371 n.18 (2008) (noting that Quentin Skinner 
confirmed that “Williams [was] a prominent part of the literature . . . with which Locke was 
certainly familiar”); cf. EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: ROGER WILLIAMS IN 
AMERICA 196 (1991), and WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: AMERICA’S 
FOUNDATION IN RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 176 (2003). 
 35. TIERNEY, supra note 3. 
 36. Id. at 27, 42 
 37. Id. at 314. 
 38. Judith Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 21, 21–
38 (Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed., 1989). 
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cruelty and torture performed by military, paramilitary, and police 
agents in any regime.”39 She eloquently rephrased and updated 
Locke’s view, which I had highlighted in my 1986 essay. She also 
contended that the liberalism of fear “certainly does begin with a 
summum malum, which all of us know and would avoid if only we 
could”—namely, the deliberate infliction of physical and emotional 
pain on the weak in order to satisfy the interests of the strong.40 
Shklar did caution against too readily drawing moral conclusions 
from the fact that “the fear of systematic cruelty is so universal,” 
since stating facts about beliefs does not prove they are morally right 
or wrong.41 However, that difficulty is avoided, as it seemed to me, 
since the implication of Locke’s theory is not, finally, about what 
human beings do believe, but about what they are capable of 
believing; not about reporting facts, but about what makes sense, 
about what can be believed, in taking a position on right and wrong. 
The Realm of Rights by Judith Jarvis Thomson, published in 
1990,42 gave new energy to the philosophical defense of natural 
rights, arguing in a way consistent with the tradition that “there is 
no possible world in which an act’s being an instance of ‘causes a 
person pain’ is irrelevant to the question whether it is wrongful.”43 
Going further, she advances a proposition very close to the 
conclusion drawn earlier about Locke: That non-trivial necessary 
moral truths exist such as, “[o]ne ought not torture babies to death 
for fun.”44 
As to Locke scholarship, John Simmons’s volume, The Lockean 
Theory of Rights,45 appearing in 1992, goes a long way toward 
showing both that Locke had “a developed and consistent theory of 
rights,” which deserves to be taken seriously, and that his theory 
serves not only “as a viable foundation for his political philosophy,” 
but also “may serve as a viable foundation for ours.”46 
John Witte’s book, The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion, 
and Human Rights in Early Modern Calvinism (2007), illuminates 
 
 39. Id. at 29. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 30. 
 42. JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990). 
 43. Id. at 15. 
 44. Id. at 18–19. 
 45. A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS (1992). 
 46. Id. at 354. 
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the way the Calvinist tradition carried forward the natural rights 
narrative, more or less picking up where Tierney left off. Unlike 
Tierney, Witte also shows the relevance of the natural rights tradition 
to questions of freedom of conscience and religious pluralism. This 
tradition is both the more restrictive approach of the later Calvin, 
Theodore Beza, and Johannes Althusius, as well as the more 
inclusive approach of John Milton, a friend and ally, personally and 
intellectually, of Roger Williams. 
Martha Nussbaum’s impressive study, Liberty of Conscience: In 
Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (2008), 
compellingly commends Williams for his distinctive contribution to 
guaranteeing equal freedom of conscience in the American 
experience. To her credit, she correctly emphasizes Williams’s 
appeals to natural or “secular” reason, which are certainly there. 
Unfortunately, she ignores the importance of his supplementary 
appeals to scripture and doctrine, as well as the central place in his 
thought of natural rights thinking, impressed upon him by the 
Calvinist tradition in which he stood. Her failure to appreciate the 
role of natural rights is especially surprising since she highlighted it 
in an earlier book,47 and has proceeded, revisionistically, to be sure, 
to appropriate it in developing her “capabilities” approach to social 
reform and development. 
But most important in the effort to bring natural rights and 
human rights together—my overall objective in the 1986 article—
was a book published in 1999 by Johannes Morsink, The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent.48 
Morsink indicates that at the very start of the process of drafting the 
UDHR, one delegation proposed to begin the document with the 
following words, “Recognizing that the United Nations has been 
established for the specific purpose of enthroning the natural rights 
of man . . . .”49 
Although the words were not adopted, Morsink thinks they 
support the presumption that there is “some kind of connection” 
between “natural rights philosophies,” which Morsink identifies with 
 
 47. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, 
SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 9–92 (2006). 
 48. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT (1999). 
 49. Id. at 282. 
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the Enlightenment, and the language adopted in the UDHR.50 It is 
not that the drafters self-consciously and intentionally attempted to 
enshrine natural rights theory. For the most part, they were not 
interested in philosophical questions and wanted to minimize, as 
much as possible, what they took to be loaded terms.51 Rather, they 
shared, usually unreflectively, certain moral assumptions with the 
natural rights tradition. One assumption was that “by nature” 
everyone everywhere possesses an “inalienable” set of moral rights 
that are independent of, and prior to, any legal rights temporal 
governments may bestow, thereby constituting a standard for 
judging the conduct of government, and especially the 
administration of force.52 
Another assumption was the expectation of standard moral 
reactions to events of a certain kind. Drafters did not object to the 
language of the Preamble, “Whereas disregard and contempt for 
human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged 
the conscience of mankind,” because they all shared the view that 
any other way of assessing the practices of the Nazis before and 
during World War II was unthinkable.53 More than anything else, it 
was their common “outrage,” prompted by the “horrors of the war,” 
and dramatized, particularly, by the Holocaust, that energized and 
guided the drafting of the UDHR.54 In his careful analysis of some 
of the articles of the UDHR, Morsink shows how the final wording 
was consciously and specifically formulated in reaction to what were 
considered egregious violations in regard to taking life, inflicting 
pain and suffering, enslaving, and so on.55 Morsink states that one 
reason the drafters did not draw on “Enlightenment precedents” is 
that they “had no need for examples from the Enlightenment . . . . 
The horrors of World War II gave them all . . . they needed to be 
justified” in producing the UDHR.56 
Part of the underlying expectation in face of the “outrages” 
under consideration was an assumption concerning the two-fold 
foundation of rights language. In the first place, “the drafters surely 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 294. 
 52. Id. at 290–295. 
 53. Id. at 90–91. 
 54. Id. at 27, 91, 300. 
 55. Id. at 36–58. 
 56. Id. at 320. 
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thought that proclaiming [the] Declaration would serve the cause of 
world peace,” a sentiment strictly in line with the thinking of 
Williams and Locke.57 However, Morsink continues, “[T]hey did not 
think of the human rights they proclaimed as only or merely a means 
to that end.”58 They also thought “these rights have an independent 
grounding [for] the members of the human family to whom they 
belong and who possess them as birthrights. If this were not so, a 
government could torture people (or violate any other right) as long 
as it was thought . . . to serve the cause of . . . peace.”59 
Morsink does not call attention to a third assumption concerning 
a connection between natural rights and human rights over the 
question of freedom of conscience, but a connection would be hard 
to miss in light of what he says about the understanding underlying 
the provisions in the UDHR. “There is no presumption in the 
Declaration that the morality of human rights requires any kind of 
religious foundation. . . . [T]he drafters went out of their way to 
avoid having the Declaration make a reference to God or to man’s 
divine origin. . . . [It] gives everyone total freedom of religion, 
including the right not to have one.”60 
As indispensable as Morsink’s discussion is for connecting natural 
rights and human rights, it is seriously deficient in that he unduly 
limits the natural rights tradition to the Enlightenment. Thanks to 
Tierney, we now know how mistaken that view is, as are beliefs that 
natural rights are to be understood as invariably egoistic and anti-
religious. 
Morsink also causes confusion when he states that the drafters 
paid no heed to natural rights thinking since all they needed was 
their impression of “the horrors of World War II” to feel justified in 
producing the UDHR. The point is that the drafters’ reaction to the 
horrors of World War II was a prime example of natural rights 
thinking. The practices designed and implemented by Hitler and the 
German Nazi regime exemplified paradigmatically “disregard and 
contempt” for the fundamental moral prohibitions aimed at 
punishing and preventing arbitrary force (and its relative, arbitrary 
neglect). Those prohibitions underlie all three of the common 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 263. 
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assumptions just laid out between natural rights and human rights: 
Priority of moral rights over legal rights; the expectation of standard 
moral reactions to events of a certain kind, including convictions 
concerning the two-fold justification of basic rights—promoting 
world peace, and considering the violation of basic rights “wrong in 
itself”; and the “natural” (secular) grounding of basic rights. 
In keeping with our summary of a proposed way of justifying 
human rights and the relation of human rights to religion, we have 
argued that a common theme of great importance brings the natural 
rights tradition and human rights language together. That is a 
fundamental commitment to a set of moral and legal rights designed 
to combat and restrain arbitrary force (and arbitrary neglect), 
whether manifested as inflicting death, suffering, or pain; or failing 
to prevent or relieve them for purely self-serving reasons; or 
coercively regulating expressions of conscience, religion; or belief 
that pose no threat to public order, safety or health. In regard to the 
subject of religion and human rights, we hope, in a word, to have 
provided some “ground to stand on.” 
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